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ABSTRACT In some encryption systems it is necessary to preserve the format and length of the encrypted
data. This kind of encryption is called FPE (Format Preserving Encryption). Currently, only two AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) modes of operation recommended by the NIST (National Institute of
Standards and Technology) are able to implement FPE algorithms, FF1 and FF3. These modes work in
an electronic codebook fashion and can be configured to encrypt databases with an arbitrary format and
length. However, there are no stream cipher proposals able to implement FPE encryption for high data
rate information flows. The main novelty of this work is a new block cipher operation mode proposal to
implement an FPE algorithm in a stream cipher fashion. It has been called CTR-MOD and it is based on a
standard block cipher working in CTR (Counter) mode and a modulo operation. The confidentiality of this
mode is analyzed in terms of its IND- CPA (Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack) advantage
of any adversary attacking it. Moreover, the encryption scheme has been implemented on an FPGA (Field
Programmable Gate Array) and has been integrated in a Gigabit Ethernet interface to test an encrypted optical
link with a real high data rate traffic flow.
INDEX TERMS FPE (format preserving encryption), stream cipher, FPGA (field programmable gate array),
Ethernet.
I. INTRODUCTION
Format Preserving Encryption, FPE, is a kind of encryption
used to cipher a plaintext preserving its original length and
format [1]–[3]. In the past, some of the first FPE solu-
tions [4], [5], were based mainly on the use of a standard
binary block cipher working in a known operation mode.
According to them, if the plaintext is in radix S, it must
be added modulo-S to the block cipher output to produce
the ciphertext. Although these techniques are based on stan-
dard modes of operation, also used to build stream ciphers,
no argument for their security has been given. In addition,
in some of them it is necessary to use an unbiasing operation
when S is not a power of two [4].
There have been many other proposals for this type
of encryption [6], but the only ones approved by the
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) are
the modes FF1 and FF3 [7]. FF1, originally called FFX
(Format-preserving Feistel-based Encryption), was proposed
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by Bellare et al. [8], whereas FF3 corresponds to the BPS-BC
component proposed byBrier et al. [9]. Both operationmodes
are based on a non-binary Feistel structure, similar to that
shown in Fig. 1, and they are able to encrypt blocks of data
with an arbitrary format in an ECB (Electronic Code Book)
fashion. In fact, although they are operation modes using
AES as the underlying block cipher, they can be considered
directly as a kind of FPE block ciphers.
Some application examples for FPE are the encryption
of databases with an arbitrary format [6], [10]–[12] such as
PANs (Primary Account Numbers) or SSNs (Social Security
Numbers), which are not in binary format. Also, FPE can
be used in communication systems when it is necessary to
encrypt certain protocols, for example, in military or indus-
trial environments [13], [14], or when encrypting some image
formats [15].
Regarding the performance of FPE encryption methods,
some studies have been done, however they aremainly related
to software implementations [14], [16]–[18]. For perfor-
mance benefits, a hardware implementation could be consid-
ered as in [13], [19] or [20].
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FIGURE 1. Generic cipher structure for format-preserving Feistel-based
encryption: (a) ciphering (b) deciphering.
A hardware implementation of an FPE stream cipher could
be advantageous for that cases where a high encryption rate is
important and the plaintext format preservation is mandatory.
A tentative solution for this cases could be also the usage of
a standard stream cipher, however this would not be a valid
solution. As an example, let us to imagine a plaintext formed
by symbols in decimal radix. Each symbol will be represented
with 4 bits. Then we could try to encrypt the plaintext thanks
to a standard stream cipher generating a keystream formed
by 4-bit words, which would produce 4-bit ciphertext sym-
bols. As the keystream generator output could be considered
random and uniformly distributed, then the XOR operation
between the keystream and the plaintext would not guaran-
tee a ciphertext also in decimal radix. For example, if the
XOR operation between a symbol of the plaintext and the
keystream produced a ciphertext value between 11 and 15,
then the resulting value would not maintain the original for-
mat. If we needed to preserve the format (length and radix)
of the plaintext, the described encryption mechanism with a
standard stream cipher would not be valid.
An application example for the utility of FPE stream
ciphers could be in [20] or [21], where a Gigabit Ethernet
data flowmust be encrypted at line rate preserving the 8b/10b
encoding properties, which means preserving its format.
Some FPE stream ciphers have been proposed. For exam-
ple, in the FF3 mode [9], the basic FPE block cipher com-
ponent BPS-BC is proposed to be used in CBC (Cipher
Block Chaining) mode, while in [20], it is proposed to be
used in CTR (Counter) mode, as CTR can be considered the
best and most modern way to achieve confidentiality-only
FIGURE 2. (a) Structure of the proposed keystream generator using a
binary block cipher in CTR mode and a modulo-S operation. (b) Structure
of PRF FK_MOD decomposed in FK and modulo-S operation. The output of
FK is the least significant L bits taken from the output of block cipher EK
which has a block size of l bits.
encryption [22]. In [21], another proposed solution consisted
of using a conventional stream cipher whose output was
subjected to a modulo-S operation to encrypt a plaintext in
radix S. However, in this case the security is not clear as the
bias introduced by the modulo-S operation is not analyzed.
The main novelty of this work is the proposal of an FPE
stream cipher solution that reduces the hardware complexity
of possible solutions based on FPE modes (FF1 and FF3) and
is based on a recommended binary block cipher. Moreover,
by means of a new operation mode that could use a standard
block cipher, such as AES, it is possible to develop a formal
security proof, in the same way that is usually done with
traditional confidentiality-only operation modes, as in CTR
or CBC. The formal security proof consists in the analysis
of the IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext
Attack) advantage expression of any adversary attacking the
proposed mode.
The proposed encryption mode in this work has been
called CTR-MOD. To parametrize its resulting structure, a
comparison of this mode with other taken as reference has
been done in terms of their IND-CPA advantage expressions.
The idea is to establish the condition under which CTR-MOD
has at least the same or greater security than the reference
mode when encrypting the same amount of information. Par-
ticularly, the mode used as reference has been CTR, since,
as mentioned before, it can be considered the best to achieve
confidentiality-only encryption [22].
CTR-MODmode consists of a standard block cipher work-
ing in CTR mode plus a modulo-S operation applied to its
output, which is added modulo-S to the plaintext. As shown
in Fig. 2a, the keystream, plaintext and ciphertext will be
also in radix S. In this figure the block size of the block
cipher is l bits, from which L are taken and used as input for
the modulo-S operator. The output values from the modulo-
S operator will be in the range {0, . . . , S − 1} and will be
represented with B bits where B = ⌈log2 S⌉.
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Algorithm 1 {C, next_ctr} = CTR(M , ctr)
CNT 0 = ctr + 1
Split M into m L-bit blocks {MB0,MB1, . . . ,MBm−1}
KBi = FK [CNT i] for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1
CNT i+1 = CNT i + 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 2
CBi = (MBi ⊕ KBi) for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1
next_ctr = CNTm−1
C = {CB0,CB1, . . . ,CBm−1}
Return {C, next_ctr}
The paper is divided in eight sections. In Section II both
modes CTR and CTR-MOD are introduced, Section III
details the IND-CPA advantage expression for CTR-MOD
mode. Subsequently, Section IV makes a comparison
between the security expression of CTR and CTR-MOD
modes to parametrize the resulting structure of the pro-
posed mode. In Section V the application case where the
proposed mode has been applied, optical Gigabit Ethernet
communication, is described. The implementation and some
encryption results of CTR-MOD in thementioned application
case are shown in Sections VI and VII, respectively. Finally,
in Section VIII conclusions are given.
II. CTR AND CTR-MOD MODES
Concrete security analysis for CTR mode was originally
established in [23]. This operation mode is a stateful (counter
based and deterministic) encryption scheme.
Let us consider a family of PRF (Pseudo Random Func-
tion) functions F such that F : K × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}L
where L is the block size, K is the keyspace and FK is a
PRF from this family configured with a random key K taken
randomly fromK (KK). The plaintext is formed by a group
of m L-bit blocks M = {MB0,MB1, . . . ,MBm−1} and it is
encrypted resulting in a ciphertext formed also by m L-bit
blocks C = {CB0,CB1, . . . ,CBm−1} thanks to its encryption
function CTR(M , ctr), as described in Algorithm 1.
The inputs ofCTR(M , ctr) are the messageM itself and the
initial value of the counter ctr , which is considered the state of
this algorithm.CNT i andKBi are the values of the counter and
keystream block in each encryption step. The l-bit counter
values are encrypted thanks to the underlying encryption
function FK giving rise to the L-bit keystream blocks. The
last counter value CNTm−1 will be used as next initial ctr
value for the next invocation of CTR(M , ctr).
The new proposed structure for the mode CTR-MOD of
Fig. 2a can be decomposed as shown in Fig. 2b, where the
block cipher in Fig. 2a has been modeled as a PRF EK . The
least significant L output bits of EK are taken as input of
the modulo-S operation, which is equivalent to perform the
modulo-2L operation at the output of EK . In this proposed
mode we have called FK and EK_MOD to the functions





case, as in CTR(M ,ctr) algorithm, FK in Fig. 2b can be
considered a PRF such that F : K × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}L ,
Algorithm 2 {C, next_ctr} = CTR−MOD(M , ctr)
CNT 0 = ctr + 1
Split M into m symbols in radix S {MB0,MB1, . . . ,MBm−1}
KBi = FK_MOD [CNT i] for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1
CNT i+1 = CNT i + 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 2
CBi = ((MBi ⊕ KBi)modS) for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1
next_ctr = CNTm−1
C = {CB0,CB1, . . . ,CBm−1}
Return {C, next_ctr}
FIGURE 3. Scheme of the attack game between the adversary A and its
oracle performing a CTR encryption scheme. Configuration bit b
determines which message is encrypted during the game. After s queries
the adversary outputs bit bˆ, meant as a guess at b.
which means that it maps the space of values
{
0, . . . ,2l − 1}
to the range
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1}. In Fig. 2b the whole module
formed by FK and the modulo-S operation has been called
FK_MOD, which means that FK_MOD(x) = FK (x)modS.
We can also consider FK_MOD a PRF such that FK_MOD :
K×{0, 1}l → {0, . . . ,S − 1}, as it maps integer values from{
0, . . . ,2l − 1} to {0, . . . ,S − 1}, where S is not necessarily
a power of two.
By taking into account Fig. 2b and the definition of
FK_MOD, the encryption function of CTR-MOD scheme
is described in Algorithm 2. This algorithm is similar to
Algorithm 1 but using FK_MOD function instead of FK and
the additionmodulo-S instead of theXORoperation (addition
modulo-2). Also, the plaintext, ciphertext and keystream are
formed by m symbols in radix S instead of m L-bit blocks.
III. CTR-MOD IND-CPA SECURITY
Usually the security of traditional operation modes for only
confidentiality is studied in the sense of IND-CPA secu-
rity [24]. The attack model is a game between an active adver-
sary A and an encryption oracle performing the encryption
scheme SE configured with a key K and a configuration bit b.
During the game the adversary chooses a sequence of s
pairs formed by two equal length messages (M01,M
1
1 ), . . . ,
(M0s ,M
1




i ) the advere-
sary receives from the oracle the ciphertext Ci corresponding
to the messageMbi . Finally the adversary must guess whether
(M01, . . . ,M
0
s ) or (M
1
1, . . . ,M
1
s ) were encrypted during the
game. It means that the adversary has to guess the value of the
configuration bit b after performing the s queries. Supposing
that the SE is CTR, in Fig. 3 a scheme of the game is shown.
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TABLE 1. Game definitions.
In this figure, for each message Mbi with a length of mi
L-bit blocks the oracle performs the CTR encryption as in
Algorithm 1, generating mi keystream blocks KB of length
L bits. Symbol ‘&’ represents the concatenation of the mi
keystream blocks that have to be XORed with Mbi .
To measure the success of the adversary in breaking a
symmetric encryption scheme SE, the adversary advantage
is defined in [25] as in the following equation:





where the ADV IND−CPASE (A) is the IND-CPA advantage of the




is the probability of the adversary A of guessing the correct
value of configuration bit b. The advantage of A can be
understood as the excess of this probability over 1/2. When
the ‘guess’ probability is almost 1/2 and then the adversary
advantage is negligible the encryption scheme SE can be
considered secure.
IND-CPA advantage for CTR mode can be expressed as in
Theorem 1, which is proven in [23].
Theorem 1: Let FK : K × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}L be the
underlying function of the encryption scheme SE that corre-
sponds with CTR symmetric encryption mode. Let A be an
adversary attacking the IND-CPA security of SE that asks
at most s queries formed each one by a pair of messages
(M0i ,M
1
i ) with a length of mi blocks with L-bit length each
one. The s message queries will produce a total number of
qL-bit encrypted blocks which means that q = ∑i=si=1 mi.
Then an adversary B (attacking the PRF security of FK and
performing q queries) can be built thanks to A, such that:
ADV IND−CPACTR (A) ≤ 2 · ADV PRFFK (B) (2)
where ADV PRFFK (B) is the prf-advantage [24] of any adversary
B over FK and ADV
IND−CPA
CTR (A) is the IND-CPA advantage of
A over the encryption scheme CTR.
Our purpose is to obtain the IND-CPA advantage for
CTR-MOD to compare its security with the typical CTR
scheme and in this way extract the necessary conditions to
achieve at least the same or greater security. It can be proved
that this advantage can be expressed as in the following
theorem:
Theorem 2: Let FK_MOD : K× {0, 1}l → {0, . . . ,S − 1}
be the underlying function of the encryption scheme SE that
corresponds with CTR-MOD symmetric encryption mode.
Let A be an adversary attacking the IND-CPA security of
SE that asks at most s queries formed each one for a pair of
messages (M0i ,M
1
i ) with a length of mi symbols of radix S.
The s message queries will produce a total number of q
encrypted symbols, which means that q =∑i=si=1 mi.
Then it is possible to build an adversary D (attacking the
PRF security of EK and performing q queries) such that:




where ADV PRFEK (D) is the prf-advantage of any adversary D
overEK as defined in [24],EK corresponds to the block cipher
that is part of the FK_MOD function and I is the difference
between L (the input bit length of modulo-S operation in
FK_MOD) and T , with T = log2S. The proof of this the-
orem is developed in the Appendix A thanks to the games
described in Table 1 and the definition of the prf-advantage
term ADV PRFFK . The explanation of these games and the term
ADV PRFFK are described in Appendix B.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS: CTR-MOD VS CTR
Although usually block ciphers are analyzed as PRFs, PRPs
(Pseudo Random Permutation) are what best models them.
Thanks to the PRF-PRP switching lemma [23] it is possible
to relate the PRF and PRP advantages of an adversary against
a block cipher as shown in (4).
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TABLE 2. IND-CPA Advantage comparison of different modes.
where ADV PRFEK (A) and ADV
PRP
EK (A) are the prf-advantage
and prp-advantage of adversary A against block cipher EK ,
respectively. The block size is l and the number of encryption
queries performed by the adversary during the prf-advantage
game is q.
According to (4), equations (2) and (3) of Theorems 1 and
2 can be rewritten as:










where EK is the underlying block cipher used in both
modes, qCTR and qCTR−MOD are the number of encrypted
blocks and symbols during the IND-CPA games of each
mode, and lCTR and lCTR−MOD are the block sizes of EK in
CTR and CTR-MOD, respectively. By each encrypted block
CTR mode encrypts lCTR information bits, while by each
encrypted symbol CTR-MOD encrypts T information bits
(T = log2S). Therefore the total number of encrypted bits in
each mode during the IND-CPA game is µCTR = qCTR · lCTR
and µCTR−MOD = qCTR−MOD · T , respectively.
According to this, it is possible to express the advantages of
equations (5) and (6) in terms of the encrypted bits and com-
pare themwith the expressions of other well-known operation
modes, as shown in Table 2.
As mentioned in Section I, we want to parametrize
CTR-MOD and establish under what condition it has at
least the same security as the classical CTR scheme when
encrypting the same amount of information, with µCTR =
µCTR−MOD = µ. It means that we want to know the con-
straints needed to get the following condition:
ADV IND−CPACTR−MOD (A) ≤ ADV
IND−CPA
CTR (A) (7)
If we assume that EK is in both modes a secure and a rec-
ommended cipher we can consider that it is a good PRP and
has a great prp-security, which means that the term ADV PRPEK
is negligible for both expressions (5) and (6). Then it is only
needed to compare the second terms of both expressions to










As qCTR = µCTR/lCTR, qCTR−MOD = µCTR−MOD/T , and
µCTR = µCTR−MOD = µ then (8) can be rewritten as:
µ2
T 2 · 2lCTR−MOD +
µ




It is possible to rewrite (9) as:
1
µ





T 2 · 2lCTR−MOD
)
(10)
In (10) I = L − T , where L is the input bit length of
modulo-S operation in CTR-MODmode. If we define the dif-
ference in bits between the output of the block cipher EK and
the input to the modulo-S operation as P = lCTR−MOD − L,
it is possible to rewrite (10) as:












As µ ≥ 1 and P ≥ 0, then the lowest bound for L that
always meets (11) is:










It is possible to conclude that if the underlying block
ciphers used in CTR and CTR-MOD modes have the same
prp-security, and the block size lCTR−MOD ≥ L, then
CTR-MOD scheme can have equal or better IND-CPA secu-
rity than CTR when encrypting the same amount of informa-
tion. It is important to notice that the block size lCTR−MOD
used in CTR-MOD will depend on the block size lCTR of the
CTR mode used as reference and the radix S of the plaintext,
as T = log2S. Expression in (12) will be the constraint nec-
essary to achieve condition (7).
V. APPLICATION CASE: ETHERNET 1000BASE-X
As we have mentioned in Section I, as far as the authors are
concerned, there are no standardized solutions for FPE stream
ciphers and its usage could be relevant in the cases where a
high encryption rate is necessary. For example, in the case of
the encryption in 1000Base-X standard for Gigabit Ethernet
optical links [20] .
The encryption in a layered communication model such
as TCP/IP can be performed at different levels of the com-
munication, such as in layers 2 or 3 with MACsec or IPsec
standards, respectively. Although encryption in physical layer
(layer 1) is less usual than in other layers some proposals
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FIGURE 4. Scheme of the Ethernet Interface formed by the PHY and MAC
(Medium Access Control) modules. MAC layer builds the Ethernet packets
transmitted to the PHY, which includes the PCS and PMA (Physical
Medium Attachment) sublayers. ENCRYPT and DECRYPT modules perform
the format preserving encryption/decryption of 8b/10b symbols at the
PCS sublayer. P/S and S/P modules are Parallel to Serial and Serial to
Parallel modules, that transmit and receive the bitstream from the optical
link.
have been made, for example related with photonic [26]–[29]
or radio [30], [31] technologies or with the physical layer
protocols [20], [21], [32].
One of the key benefits of performing the encryption at
layer 1 is the possibility of masking the data traffic pattern,
then achieving additional privacy, which permits to hide the
existence of data transmission as in [26] with the optical
steganography or in [20] with the encryption at encoding
sublayer.
Our application case is the standard 1000Base-X,
as in [20], [21]. In both cases the encryption is performed
in one of the sublayers of physical layer, where the 8b/10b
encoding is performed. This sublayer is called PCS (Physical
Coding Sublayer). The 8b/10b encoding at PCS is used to
provide certain properties to the bitstream that is transmitted
through the Gigabit Ethernet optical link, such as DC balance,
high transition density and short run length. Ciphering at PCS
level must be performed in a way that the 8b/10b encoding
properties are preserved, which means that the encryption
method must preserve the same format in the plaintext and
the ciphertext.
On the other hand, encryption and decryption modules
must be located in the 1000Base-X datapath as shown
in Fig. 4, where an optical Ethernet interface is shown.
In order to preserve the coding properties, the encryp-
tion of an 8b/10b symbol must give as result another valid
8b/10b symbol, which means to perform an FPE encryp-
tion. Ciphered symbols must be within the alphabet of sym-
bols supported by the encoding standard. For this reason,
the generic structure of the ENCRYPT module is built as
shown in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5, since S is the possible number of valid 8b/10b
symbols, these are mapped to an integer value in the range
{0, . . . , S − 1}, giving rise to a plaintext in radix S. Then a
modulo-S addition is performed between the mapped sym-
bols and a keystream also represented with values in the range
{0, . . . , S − 1}. After that, the resulting ciphered values are
reverse-mapped to its corresponding 8b/10b symbols which
are finally encoded to 10-bit values and sent to the serializer.
FIGURE 5. Location and generic structure of a stream cipher in a physical
layer with 8b/10b line encoding. 8b/10b symbols are formed by eight
data bits and one control bit. These symbols are mapped in
CIPHER_OPERATION block thanks to MAP and DEMAP modules. The
mapped symbols are represented with B = ⌈log2 S⌉ bits.
FIGURE 6. Overall structure for the streaming encryption system in a
physical layer with 8b/10b encoding using CTR-MOD mode. Decryption
will be as encryption but using a modulo-267 subtraction instead of an
addition. 8b/10b symbols are formed by 8 data bits, D_in, and one control
bit K_in. The symbols are mapped to 9-bit values (B = 9) in the range [0,
266] as S = 267.
In the 1000Base-X standard only 267 possible symbols are
valid in the 8b/10b encoding, which means that S =267.
In this work, CTR-MOD operation mode has been used to
perform the keystream generation and the modulo-S addition
of Fig. 5, in the same way as Algorithm 2 of Section II.
VI. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
We assume that we want to achieve at least the same or
better IND-CPA security than a recommended block cipher
working in CTR mode. Let be the block and key size of
this reference block cipher a standard length of 128 bits.
According to (12) if lCTR = 128 bits, and T = log2S ∼= 8.06
bits, then lCTR−MOD must be lCTR−MOD ≥ L ≥ 149 bits to
achieve the security that meets condition (7). By taking into
account these parameters, proposed CTR-MOD structure has
been adapted to the generic scheme of Fig. 5. The resulting
encryption scheme is shown in Fig. 6.
As the underlying block cipher must have a block size
greater than 128 bits because lCTR−MOD ≥ 149, the well-
known Rijndael [33] cipher has been used. The main dif-
ference between Rijndael and AES (Advance Encryption
Standard) is the range of configuration values for the block
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FIGURE 7. Test set-up scheme.
TABLE 3. Comparison with other hardware solutions.
size and the key length, in fact AES is a subset of Rijndael.
While in AES the block size is fixed to 128 bits, in Rijndael
it can take three values, 128, 192 and 256 bits. In this work
Rijndael has been configured with 192 bit block size and a
128 bit key length, which means lCTR−MOD = 192.
The block MOD_2149 of Fig. 6 is simply to take the
149 least significant bits of the Rijndael output. However,
the second modulo operation, the MOD_267 module, takes
more resources as 267 is not a power of two. Its implemen-
tation has been based on [34], which presents a high-speed
hardware structure for a generic operation ‘x mod z’.
The final structure shown in Fig. 6 has been synthetized
using a Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA. Regarding the hardware
resources used, they have been compared in Table 3 with
other solutions based in the mentioned FF1 and FF3 modes
for FPE [13], [20], and an ad-hoc stream cipher [21]. In this
table, the amount of registers, LUTs (Look Up Tables) and
BRAMs (Block RAMs) are shown. According to these results
it is possible to conclude that the solution in this work
achieves a better figure in Encryption_Rate/Slice than the
others.
Finally, to test the encryption mechanism with real traf-
fic, the KEYSTREAM_GENERATOR and CIPHER OPER-
ATION modules of Fig. 6 have been integrated in the
ENCRYPT and DECRYPTmodules of the Ethernet Interface
in Fig. 4. Two Ethernet Interfaces have been implemented
in the Xilinx FPGA platform as shown in Fig.7. The PHY
sides of both interfaces have been connected to optical SFP
(Small Form Factor Pluggable) modules able to transmit at
1 Gbps data rate through a fiber link. Also two Ethernet
Frame Generators have been connected to the MAC sides
of both Ethernets Interfaces to test the encrypted link with
real traffic. With these generators it is possible to produce
Ethernet frame flows configured with different frame size,
payload and interframe gap.
Note that in Table 3 we have only compared the solution
in this work with other FPE solutions. A comparison of the
proposed system with other well-known binary stream cipher
implementations could be done. However, as mentioned in
Section I this kind of ciphers cannot be a valid solution to
preserve the format of the plaintext. In addition, although
stream ciphers are suitable for high speed applications, their
cryptanalysis and design criteria are less understood than
block ciphers [35]. Indeed, a stream cipher application can
be implemented easily thanks to a secure block cipher such
as AES working in CTR mode, considered secure thanks to
its formal security proof [23]. In the same way CTR-MOD
mode can be considered enough safe as an FPE stream cipher
structure.
VII. ENCRYPTION RESULTS
As mentioned in previous Section, one of the key benefits
of performing the encryption at layer 1 is the possibility of
masking the data traffic pattern, achieving additional privacy,
as possible passive attackers are not able to detect the pres-
ence of current communications.
In the particular case of 1000Base-X, the transmission
of 8b/10b symbols is carried out constantly, including in the
case no frame is being transmitted or during the gap between
frames. In these situations, the PHY always transmits idle
sets of 8b/10b symbols, whose purpose is to maintain the
synchronization between remote terminals.
To check the masking capability of the encryption, the SE
(Shannon Entropy) in (13) has been measured for dif-
ferent encrypted and non-encrypted frame traffic patterns.
The 8b/10b symbol stream for each traffic pattern, mapped
between 0 and S−1, has been grouped in tuples of t symbols
called βt , and the probability for each tuple, P(βt ), has been
calculated. Particularly, SE has been measured for values of t






P (βt) · log2 P (βt) (13)
Ideally, if every t-tuple (βt ) is equally likely with probabil-
ity P (βt) = p = S−t the value of Shannon Entropy for every
t should be equals to SE = log2 S = log2 267 ∼= 8.0606.
In Fig. 8 the SE measured for different traffic patterns
is shown. Pattern A corresponds with no frame transmis-
sion, where only idle sets are transmitted over the link. Pat-
terns B, C andD correspond to continuous frame transmission
of 1024-bytes length with random payload at rates of 10.2%,
50% and 91% of the maximum Gigabit line rate. Pattern
E corresponds to continuous frame transmission of random
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FIGURE 8. Shannon Entropy measured for different traffic flows of
8b/10b symbols grouped in tuples of t symbols with t from 1 to 2.
Ethernet traffic patterns are called A, B, C, D and E and their encrypted
versions, A’, B’, C’, D’ and E’. The red line marks the maximum entropy
achievable with an 8b/10b data flow.
FIGURE 9. (a) K_out flag pattern without encryption when no Ethernet
frame is transmitted; (b) K_out flag pattern without encryption when
transmitting an Ethernet frame burst; (c) K_out flag pattern after
encryption regardless of the transmission or non-transmission of
Ethernet frames.
length and payload and minimum gap between frames. The
non-encrypted versions of these patterns have different SE,
however every encrypted version has the maximum possi-
ble SE, which makes them indistinguishable from each other
and therefore proves themasking property, as shown in Fig. 8.
Moreover, to appreciate graphically this masking property
is interesting to show the signal waveforms of 8b/10b flows
after the encryption module. As shown in Fig. 6, 8b/10b
symbols are formed by one control bit and eight data bits.
In Fig. 6, after the encryption operation, these are called
K_out and D_out, respectively, and they are used by the
8b/10b encoder to generate 10 bits. Each 8b/10b symbol is a
control or data one depending whether its K_out flag is ‘1’ or
‘0’, respectively. When no frames are transmitted (pattern A)
and encryption is disabled, Ethernet physical layer always
transmit continuously idle sets composed by two consecutive
symbols, one control symbol (with K_out equals to ‘1’) and
a data symbol (with K_out equals to ‘0’). It means that the
K_out pattern in this situation is a signal that switches contin-
uously between ‘0’ and ‘1’, as shown in Fig. 9a.When frames
are transmitted (patterns B, C, D, E), the K_out flag will
behave as a blast signal, as the idle sets are only transmitted
in the space between frames. During frame transmission only
8b/10b data symbols are transmitted which will make K_out
flag remain to ‘0’ as shown in Fig. 9b.
Finally, by enabling encryption, 8b/10b symbols are
ciphered and K_out flag and D_out are randomized (in every
flow A, B, C, D or E) making indistinguishable which pattern
is being transmitted, as shown in Fig. 9c.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work the authors have presented a new block cipher
operation mode able to preserve the format of the plaintext
when encrypting a high speed data stream. A security analysis
has been made proving that it is possible to get at least the
same or better security than a traditional CTR mode working
with a standard 128-bits block cipher. The proposed solution
permits the use of classical block ciphers instead of ad-hoc
stream ciphers whose cryptanalysis and design criteria are
less understood, or FPE structures whose architecture is more
complex and entails larger hardware resources.
A parametrization and implementation of this FPE
proposal has been carried out for the specific case of opti-
cal Gigabit Ethernet communications, achieving an Encryp-
tion_Rate/Slice better than in other existing FPE solutions,
including FF1 and FF3 modes.
Finally, the masking property of the encryption at physical
layer in 1000Base-X standard has been tested with the pro-
posed operation mode, checking that different data patterns
can be made indistinguishable from each other, including
from the situation of no frame transmission.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to [23], and taking into account that CTR-MOD
is a CTR-like mode but using a modulo-S addition (instead
of an XOR operation) and an underlying PRF function
FK_MOD that maps integer values from
{
0, . . . ,2l − 1} to
{0, . . . ,S − 1} instead from {0, . . . ,2l − 1} to {0, . . . ,2L − 1}
as FK , it is possible to express the IND-CPA security of
CTR-MOD in a similar way as in (2) such that:
ADV IND−CPACTR−MOD(A) ≤ 2 · ADV PRFFK _MOD(B) (14)
where ADV PRFFK _MOD (B) is the prf-advantage of an adversary
B over FK_MOD. Therefore, by obtaining this advantage it
will be possible to get the expression for the IND-CPA advan-
tage over the proposed scheme. The generic prf-advantage
ADV PRFFK of any adversary over a PRF FK is defined in [24]
and an explanation about it is detailed in the Appendix B.
Thanks to the games defined in Table 1 it is possible to
express the term ADV PRFFK _MOD (A) according the following
lemma:
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Lemma 1: Let be FK and EK PRFs taken from the families
of functions F : K×{0, 1}l→{0, 1}L and E : K×{0, 1}l →
{0, 1}l . Let be Func_MOD and Func′_MOD two functions
defined as in Table 1. On the one hand, Func_MOD(x) =
f (x)modS, where f is a random function taken from the set of
functions Func (l,L) : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}L . On the other hand
Func′_MOD(x) = f (x)mod2L , where f is a random function
taken from the set of functions Func (l, l) : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l .
Then their prf-advantages can be related as in the following
equation:
ADV PRFFK _MOD (A) = ADV PRFEK (D)+ ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A)
+ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A) (15)
In addition, it is possible to express the prf-advantages
of any adversary A over the functions Func_MOD and
Func′_MOD according to the Lemmas 2 and 3, respectively:
Lemma 2: Let be Func_MOD a function defined as in
Lemma 1. Then any adversary A making q oracle queries
when attacking the prf-security of Func_MOD will obtain an





where I = L − T and T = log2S.
Lemma 3: Let be Func′_MOD a function defined as in
Lemma 1. Then any adversary A making q oracle queries
when attacking the prf-security of Func′_MOD will obtain
an advantage such that:
ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A) = 0 (17)
By taking into account Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 it is possi-
ble to derive the following expression from equation (15):




Finally, by substituting the expression of the term
ADV PRFFK _MOD (A) in equation (14) it is possible to derive (3)
which proves Theorem 2. For clarity purposes, proofs of
Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 are given in the Appendices C, D and
E using the games definitions of Table 1. Game definitions
are explained in Appendix B.
APPENDIX B
GAME DEFINITIONS
In this Section the definition of term ADV PRFFK and the expla-
nation of games in Table 1 are described. These are necessary
to develop the proof of Theorem 2 and Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
A. PRF ADVANTAGE ADV PRFFK
The generic prf-advantage ADV PRFFK (A) of any adversary A
over a PRF FK is defined in [24] according to the following
definition:
Definition 1: Let F : K × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}L be a family
of functions, and let adversary A be an algorithm that takes
from an oracle a function g: {0, 1}l → {0, 1}L , that can be
configured as a random function or a PRF FK depending on a
TABLE 4. Game EXbF .
FIGURE 10. Scheme of the game EXbF (a) between the adversary A and its
oracle. Configuration bit b determines which function is being
implemented by the oracle, FK or f . The outputs of the resulting function
g are analyzed by A to return bˆ, meant as a guess at b.
bit b, and tries to distinguish which function has been taken.
The function g is passed to the adversary as an argument and
it returns a result bit bˆ (bˆ ← A(g)) meant as a guess at b.
According to the game EXbF in Table 4 the prf-advantage of
A over FK is defined as:
ADV PRFFK (A) = P
[









EXbF (A) = 1
]
is the probability that the result of the
game EXbF (A) is bˆ = 1.
The game EXbF (A) is configured with the bit b. If b = 1 a
key of length k bits is selected randomly from the keyspaceK.
It is expressed as K
$← {0, 1}k , where the operator $←
means a ‘random selection’. In addition, the argument g for
the adversary A is selected to be the PRF FK configured
with key K . On the other hand, when the game EXbF (A)
is configured with b = 0 the argument for A is a random
function f , taken randomly from the whole set of functions
Func(l,L) : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}L , which is expressed as f $←
Func(l,L). The value of ADV PRFFK (A) measures how well
A is doing when distinguishing between f and FK . Game
EXbF can be represented graphically as in Fig. 10, where
the oracle implements the function g, that can be FK or f
depending on the value of b. The adversary A interacts with g
by performing q queries of l-bit values ti,
{
t0, t1, . . . , tq−1
}
,
and the oracle responds to the adversary queries with qL-bit
output values g(t i). Finally A returns bˆ meant as guess at b.
In order to obtain the expression for the ADV PRFFK _MOD(A)
we have defined a set of games shown in Table 1.
In these games, as in game EXbF , the operator
$←
means a ‘random selection’, and Func(l,L), Func(l, l)
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and Func(l,T ) represent sets of functions such that
Func(l,L) : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}L , Func(l, l) : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l
and Func(l,T ) : {0, 1}l → {0, . . . ,S − 1} with T = log2S.
In the same way as in game EXbF , games in Table 1 can
measure the ability for an adversary A to distinguish between
two functions depending on the configuration of the bits b
and n. Moreover, in each game A performs q queries of values
ti,
{
t0, t1, . . . , tq−1
}
, to an oracle implementing a function g.
AdversaryA receives from the oracle q output values g(t i) and
returns a result bit as in EXbF .
B. GAMES B AND D
Games EnF ′ (A) and E
n
F (A) are games B and D respectively
in Table 1, they are only configured with the configuration bit
n, and at the beginning of both a random key K is obtained,
such that K
$← {0, 1}k .
In game B, EnF ′ (A), adversary A tries to distinguish between
functions FK_MOD and Func_MOD. FK_MOD is defined as
in Section II, where FK_MOD(x) = FK (x)mod S, and FK
is the PRF configured with the random key K . Func_MOD
is a function obtained after applying modulo-S operation to
the output of the function f , such that Func_MOD(x) =
f (x)mod S. Function f is selected randomly from the set of
functions Func(l,L).
In game D, EnF (A), adversary A tries to distinguish between
functions EK_MOD and Func′_MOD. EK_MOD is defined





EK is the PRF function that represents the block cipher of
Fig. 2b configured with the random key K . Func′_MOD is
a function obtained after applying a modulo-2L operation to
the output of a function f selected randomly from the set of
functions Func(l, l).
As summary, in EnF ′ (A), adversary A tries to distinguish
between a PRF and a random functionwith different input and
output bit lengths, both followed by a modulo-S operation,
while in EnF (A) adversary A tries to distinguish between a
PRF and a random function with the same input and output
bit lengths, both followed by a modulo-2L operation.
C. GAMES A AND C
Games EnbF ′ (A) and E
nb
F (A) are games A and C respectively,
they are configured with the mode bit n and the configuration
bit b, and at the beginning of both a random keyK is obtained,
such that K
$← {0, 1}k .
In EnbF ′ (A) adversary A will try to distinguish between a
random function selected from the set of functions Func(l,T )
and a function r that depends on the value of the mode bit n.
When n = 1, this function is configured as r = FK_MOD as
defined in Section II, while with n = 0, r = Func_MOD that
is defined as in the previous subsection.
In EnbF (A) adversary A will try to distinguish between a
random function selected from the set of functions Func(l,L)
and a function r that depends on the value of the mode bit
n. With n = 1, r = EK_MOD as defined in Section II,
and when n = 0, r is configured as r = Func′_MOD as
defined in the previous subsection.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
According to game A in Table 1 and the definition of the prf-
advantage in (19), we can define the following prf-advantages
of adversary A over FK_MOD and Func_MOD:
ADV PRFFK _MOD (A) = P
[




E10F ′ (A) = 1
]
(20)
ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A) = P
[









EnbF ′ (A) = 1
]
is the probability that the result of the
game EnbF ′ (A) is bˆ = 1. In the case of (20) we are measuring
the advantage of A over FK_MOD as we are performing the
game E1bF ′ (A), and in this case A tries to distinguish between
the PRF FK_MOD and a random function taken from the
set of functions Func(l,T ). Both FK_MOD and Func(l,T )
map values between {0, 1}l and {0, . . . ,S − 1}. In the case
of (21) we are measuring the advantage of A over Func_MOD
as we are performing game E0bF ′ (A) where A tries to distin-
guish between Func_MOD and a random function taken from
Func(l,T ).
According to Table 1, if b = 0 the input argument for





E00F ′ (A) = 1
] = P [E10F ′ (A) = 1]. Then it is pos-
sible to derive the following expression from (20) and (21):
ADV PRFFK _MOD (A)− ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A)
= P
[




E01F ′ (A) = 1
]
(22)
As the inputs for adversary A in games En1F ′ (A) and E
n
F ′ (A)
are the same then P
[
EnF ′ (A) = 1
] = P [En1F ′ (A) = 1], which
means that:
ADV PRFFK _MOD (A)− ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A)
= P
[




E0F ′ (A) = 1
]
(23)
In Fig. 11a, a graphical diagram for game EnF ′ (A) is shown.
Adversary A makes q queries to the oracle that implements
the function FK_MOD or Func_MOD depending on the
value of configuration bit n. The diagram in Fig. 11a can
be represented also as in Fig. 11b. As both schemes are
equivalent from the point of view of adversary A we can
conclude that it is possible to build an adversary C from A
that produces thesame result bit as A. Moreover, as the role
of adversary C in Fig. 11b is the same as the role of adversary
A in Fig. 10 when performing game EXbF (A), (23) can be
rewritten as:
ADV PRFFK _MOD (A)− ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A)
= P
[












EX0F (C) = 1
]
= ADV PRFFK (C) (24)
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FIGURE 11. Diagram of (a) experiment EnF ′ (A) and (b) its equivalent using
the adversary C. In both cases adversary A generates the same amount of
queries to the oracles. In each query A sends ti word represented with l
bits and receives g(ti) symbol, represented with B = ⌈log2 S⌉ bits. At the
end, adversary A produces the result bit nˆ.
As defined in Section II, FK (x) = EK_MOD(x), which
means that:




On the other hand, thanks to game C in Table 1, it is
possible to define the following advantages:
ADV PRFEK _MOD (A) = P
[




E10F (A) = 1
]
(26)
ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A) = P
[









EnbF (A) = 1
]
is the probability that the result of the
game EnbF (A) is bˆ = 1. In the case of (26) we are measuring
advantage of A over EK_MOD, as we are performing game
E1bF (A), and in this case adversary A tries to distinguish
between EK_MOD and a random function taken from the
set of function Func (l,L) . In the case of (27), as we are
performing game E0bF (A) the adversary A tries to distinguish
between Func′_MOD and a random function taken from
Func (l,L) , which is equivalent to measure the advantage
over Func′_MOD.
According to Table 1, if b = 0 the input argument
for adversary A is always the same in games E00F (A) and
E10F (A), therefore P
[
E00F (A) = 1
] = P [E10F (A) = 1]. Then,
as E00F (A) = E10F (A) and En1F (A) = EnF (A) it is possible to
FIGURE 12. Diagram of (a) experiment EnF (A) and (b) its equivalent using
the adversary D. In both cases adversary A generates the same amount of
queries to the oracles. In each query A sends ti word and receives g(ti)
symbol. At the end, adversary A tries to guess the configuration bit nˆ.
derive (28) from (26) and (27).
ADV PRFEK _MOD (A)− ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A)
= P
[












E0F (A) = 1
]
(28)
In Fig. 12a, game EnF (A) is shown graphically. As Fig. 12a
and Fig. 12b are equivalent from the point of view of adver-
sary A, it is possible to build an adversary D from A that
produces the same return bit than A. In addition, the role of
adversary D in Fig. 12b is the same as the role of adversary
A in Fig. 10 when performing game EXbF (A). Then equa-
tion (28) results as:
ADV PRFEK _MOD (A)− ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A)
= P
[












EX0F (D) = 1
]
= ADV PRFEK (D) (29)
Therefore:
ADV PRFEK _MOD (A)=ADV PRFEK (D)+ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A) (30)
According to (30), equation (25) can be written as:
ADV PRFFK _MOD (A) = ADV PRFEK (D)+ ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A)
+ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A) (31)
which is the same expression as in equation (15) and then
proves Lemma 1.
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FIGURE 13. Domain
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1
}
is mapped into interval{
0, . . . ,S − 1}. Each interval Si is mapped in the range {0, . . . ,S − 1}.
As 2L is not a multiple of S the last green interval is called Slast and it
contains only R values that are mapped to the range
{
0, . . . ,R − 1}.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To prove the Lemma 2 it is necessary to obtain the
term ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A), that depends on game E
01
F ′ (A) and
E00F ′ (A) as shown in (21). This term measures the capabil-
ity of A for distinguishing the function Func_MOD(x) =
f (x)modS, where f is a random function taken from the
set of functions Func(l,L), from a random function from
the set Func(l,T ), where T = log2S and S is not a power
of two. The function f maps values from the domain{
0, . . . ,2l − 1} to {0, . . . ,2L − 1}. By applying modulo-S
operation to the outputs of function f , values in the domain{
0, . . . ,2L − 1} are mapped to domain {0, . . ., S − 1}. There-
fore function Func_MOD will map values from the domain{
0, . . . ,2l − 1} to {0, . . ., S − 1}, as random functions in the
set Func(l,T ) do. In Fig. 13, the way of mapping values
from
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1} to {0, . . . , S − 1} thanks to modulo-S
operation is shown. As S is not a power of two, 2L is not a
multiple of S. Then the remainder R of the division between
2L and S can be written as:
R = 2L − m · S (32)
where m is the quotient of the division.
According to (32) the range
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1} can be divided
in m blocks with S values each one and one last with only R
values, as shown in Fig. 13. The m blocks are called Si, with
0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and the last one with R values is called Slast .
After modulo-S operation, values in each range Si will be
equally distributed in destination range {0, . . . ,S − 1}, how-
ever the last range Slast includes the last R values in the range
{m · S, . . . ,m · S + R− 1} and they only are mapped in the
first R values of the destination range, {0, . . . ,R− 1}. It will
make that each value in the destination range {0, . . . ,R− 1}
can have one more occurrence than values in the range
{R, . . . ,S − 1}. Therefore, if each input of modulo-S opera-
tion were uniformly distributed in the range
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1}
it will be possible to consider that its output will not be
uniformly distributed, asR is not zero. It means that the output






for 0 ≤ x ≤ R− 1
m
2L
for R ≤ x ≤ S − 1
(33)
where P (x) is the probability of occurrence of value x at the
output of the modulo-S operation.
During game E0bF ′ (A), the adversary A makes q queries and
they are not repeated. The queries are made to an oracle
performing function g, that can be configured thanks to b
value as g = Func_MOD or taken randomly from the set
Func(l,T ).
In E0bF ′ (A), f ∈ Func(l,L) and it is a random function.
According to [24] if the inputs of a random function f are not
repeated we can consider that each output of f is randomly
and uniformly distributed in its output range, which in this
case is
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1}, independently of anything else. The
same assumption can be done with the case of a random
function from the set Func(l,T ) we can consider that each
of its output is random and uniformly distributed in the range
{0, . . . ,S − 1}.
In the case of game E00F ′ (A), as g is a random function
taken from the set Func(l,T ), the final output from the ora-
cle can be considered random and uniformly distributed in
{0, . . . ,S − 1}.
However, in game E01F ′ (A), the oracle performs as function
g the function Func_MOD(x) = f (x)modS. As f is a ran-
dom function with a uniform distributed output in the range{
0, . . . ,2L − 1}, the output of Func_MOD will have a prob-
ability distribution as in (33) owing to modulo-S operation.
Let us consider two situations when performing game
E01F ′ (A). The first of them is when during the q queries made
by adversary A, at the output of f ∈ Func(l,L) no value falls
in the range Slast , but in any of the remainng Si intervals.
In this case the output of modulo-S could be considered ran-
domly and uniformly distributed in the range {0, . . . ,S − 1},
which is a situation indistinguishable from the game E00F ′ (A),
where adversary analyzes the outputs from g ∈ Func(l,T ).
Let us name this situation ‘Good interval’ or Gint.
The second case is the opposite, when during the q queries
performed in E01F ′ (A), some output of f falls in the range Slast ,
then we can consider that this result could make us per-
ceive the behavior of Func_MOD no to be like a random
function taken from Func(l,T ). Due to that it is possible to
consider that, at least, a good adversary could have a chance
to know that we are running E01F ′ (A) instead of E
00
F ′ (A). Let’s
name this situation ‘Bad interval’ or Bint.
If we call w1 to the event E01F ′ (A) = 1 and w0 to the event
E00F ′ (A) = 1 then:
P [w1] = P[w1|Gint] · P[Gint]
+P[w1|Bint] · P[Bint] (34)
where P [Gint] and P [Bint] are the probabilities of Gint and
Bint to occur during the q queries made by the adversary in
game E01F ′ (A), respectively.
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As the adversary cannot distinguish the situation Gint dur-
ing game E01F ′ (A) from game E
00
F ′ (A) because the output from








E01F ′ (A) = 1|Gint
]
→
P [w0] = P [w1|Gint] (35)
In addition, by taking into account (34) and (35) we can
rewrite (21) as:
ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A) = P
[




E00F ′ (A) = 1
]
= P [w1]− P [w0] = P [w1]− P [w1|Gint] =
P[w1|Gint] · (P [Gint]−1)+P[w1|Bint]·P [Bint] (36)
Moreover, as P [Gint] = 1 − P [Bint] then (36) can be
rewritten as:
ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A) = (P [w1|Bint]− P [w1|Gint]) · P[Bint]
(37)
To get an upper bound for ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A) we assume the
worst case where a perfect adversary is able to always detect
the function Func_MOD when running game E01F ′ (A) and
situationBint is produced, whichmeans that it always gives as
result E01F ′ (A) = 1. It means that with this perfect adversary
P [w1|Bint] = 1. Therefore (37) can be rewritten as:
ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A) = (1− P [w1|Gint]) · P[Bint] ≤ P[Bint]
(38)
The probability for an output value of the random func-
tion f ∈ Func(l,L) of falling into the range Slast , is equal
to R
/
2L , as this range has R values among the 2L possible.
As q queries are performed by the adversary A during game
E01F ′ (A), the probability for any of the q oracle outputs of
falling in Slast is P[Bint] =q · R
/
2L . Therefore (38) can be
expressed as:
ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A)≤q · R
/
2L (39)
By taking into account equation (32), as I = L − T ,




, R can be expressed as:

























Therefore (39) can be rewritten as:
ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A) ≤ q · R
/

















which corresponds with the equation (16) and finishes the
proof of Lemma 2.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Regarding the term ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A), it is possible to
make a similar reasoning to that for ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A).
In Func′_MOD the output of the random function f ∈
Func(l, l) is subjected to a modulo-2L operation. Thanks
to this operation the output range of f ,
{
0, . . . ,2l − 1},
is mapped to the space
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1}. This case differs
from the situation of Lemma 2, when analyzing Func_MOD,
where the space
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1} is mapped to the range
{0, . . . ,S − 1}.
In the proof of Lemma 2, the output interval of f ∈
Func(l,L) is
{
0, . . . ,2L − 1}. It is divided in m subinter-
vals Si with S values each one, and one last subinterval
Slast with the R remaining values. Each subinterval Si is
mapped to {0, . . . ,S − 1} after modulo S operation while
Slast is mapped to {0, . . . ,R− 1}. This concludes in equa-
tion (39) obtaining ADV PRFFunc_MOD(A) as a function of R,
ADV PRFFunc_MOD (A)≤q · R
/
2L .
In the case ofFunc′_MODwe couldmake the same reason-
ing as for Lemma 2, it is possible to divide the output range
of f ∈ Func(l, l), {0, . . . ,2l − 1}, into m intervals Si with
2L values each one and one last subinterval Slast with the R′
remaining values, where R′ is the remainder of the division
between 2l and 2L . Then it is possible to derive an expression
similar to (39) for ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A):
ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A)≤q · R′
/
2l (42)
In Lemma 2, S is not a power of two and 2L is not amultiple
of S, then it was possible to deduce that R = 2L − m · S,
however in this case as 2l is a multiple of 2L the remainder of
its division is zero, that is R′ = 0.
It means that ADV PRFFunc′_MOD (A) = 0, which is the same
expression as (17) and therefore it proves Lemma 3.
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